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INTRODUCTION
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
A common theme running through three of the five lead articles in this
symposium is the need for regulatory reform. Professor Karmel's article,
Greenmail, the Control Premium and Shareholder Duty,' addresses one of
the more pernicious defensive tactics to a threatened takeover-greenmail,
whereby the target company's management uses corporate funds to buy out
a would-be control acquirer and thereby perpetuate its incumbency. Profes-
sor Karmel's article thus analyzes the shortcomings of the current regulatory
scheme in monitoring, an important aspect of corporate governance. Pro-
fessor Markham's article, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform
Is Needed2 focuses on market regulation. In particular Professor Markham's
article addresses many of the perceived deficiencies of the trading systems
used by commodity exchanges in this country. Professor Warren's article,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in the European Community,3 deals with
the regulation of European insider trading. The article suggests that the
European community would be well advised to learn from the mistakes of
the insider trading regulation in this country and should enact a more
stringent system of regulation.
Mr. Treadway's article, Looking for the Perfect Enforcement Remedy-
Old Wine in New Bottles or. Have I seen this Movie Before?,4 rather, than
issue a call for reform of regulatory policy, gives a well-reasoned defense
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of recent expansions of the SEC's enforcement powers. Regulatory policy
and enforcement power are important issues in securities and commodities
regulation. An equally important question involves the proper role of the
courts in interpreting the applicable law. When a federal statute does not
expressly address issues relating to claims created by the statute, the courts
must decide where to look to fill the gap. Professor Johnson's article, Some
Thoughts about Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities Laws,5
examines the process of interstitial lawmaking and the securities laws.
TREADWAY ON SEC ENFORCEMENT
In recent years, Congress significantly expanded the SEC's enforcement
powers. Most notably the Commission was given the power to issue cease
and desist orders and also to seek orders barring individuals from serving
in an official capacity with companies subject to th SEC's reporting
requirements. This is in addition to the ability to impose fines in adminis-
trative proceedings and increased civil penalties that can be obtained by
going to court. At various times during the SEC's history, the Commission
has been criticized for abusing its authority. Mr. Treadway's contribution
to this issue6 presents an excellent defense of similar attacks on the expansion
of the Commission's enforcement powers. As Mr. Treadway points out, the
SEC has a long history of seeking remedies that are effective in providing
a deterrent without unduly punishing violators of the securities laws. The
current legislative reforms, and SEC use of its enforcement powers, as Mr.
Treadway explains, are merely a continuation of the Commission's judicious
use of its enforcement authority.
JOHNSON ON INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING
Professor Johnson's article7 examines the difficult question of how
courts should fill gaps in the securities laws. In two recent cases, the
Supreme Court took different approaches to gap filling. In one case, the
Court looked to the most analogous federal law.8 In the other case, decided
in the same term, the Court held that state law applied.9 In reaching these
results, the court reasoned that statutes of limitations in federally created
rights of action are essentially federal in nature, whereas rules relating to
derivative actions are a matter of corporate law that traditionally has been
5. Johnson, Some Thoughts about Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities
Laws, 48 WASH. & LEa L. REv. 879 (1991).
6. Treadway, supra note 4.
7. Johnson, supra note 5.
8. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, Ill S. Ct. 2773 (1991)
(holding that most analogous federal, rather than state, statute of limitations is to be applied
to implied private right of action under SEC Rule lOb-5).
9. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1711 (1991) (deferring to state
law on application of requirement in derivative suits that plaintiff shareholder make demand
on directors to bring suit).
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reserved to the states. Professor Johnson suggests that in deciding whether
to apply federal or state law, the federal courts when engaging in interstitial
lawmaking should be more concerned with which result would result in the
better policy. Professor Johnson thus is suggesting a form of judicial
activism that would be more outcome oriented than the more traditional
doctrinal approach.
KARMEL ON GREENMAL
In her article on greenmail,10 Professor Karmel presents a number of
ways to control the pernicious problem of paying a "bribe" (paid from
corporate assets) to a minority shareholder for not seeking control of a
company. Greenmail in essence compensates a person seeking control of a
company for losing the control contest. Furthermore, it preserves the jobs
of existing management of the target company but is financed not by the
managers who benefit directly but by the corporation and therefore by the
shareholders derivatively. The shareholders are thus asked not only to
finance the entrenchment of current management but also to pay off a
would-be control acquirer who, if successful, might well offer the share-
holders a price for their shares at a premium well above the market value.
Although for several years most observers have condemned the practice of
greenmail, legislative inaction and judicial overreliance on the business
judgment rule have combined to leave greenmail virtually unregulated.
Professor Karmel aptly points out the anomaly of prohibiting controlling
shareholders from reaping excessive control premiums while at the same
time permitting minority shareholders to reap a comparable premium for
not taking control.
MARKHAM ON THE COMMODITY ExcHANGE MONOPOLY
Professor Markham" analyzes the operation of the commodities markets
which recently have been the subject of a great deal of bad press due to
various floor trading scandals. A major (and no doubt controversial) portion
of Professor Markham's proposed reform is the easing of the contract
market monopoly that has been a part of the Commodity Exchange Act
since its enactment in 1936. Professor Markham suggests that economic
forces rather than regulatory barriers should determine which contracts are
traded on which exchanges. A number of Professor Markham's proposals
involve bringing the regulation of the commodities markets more in line
with that of the securities markets. Thus, for example, he recommends
expanding the board of directors of commodities exchanges to include public
representation. This, he believes, will take these self-regulatory organizations
out of the grip of the regulated industry-a situation which, not surprisingly,
has led to an impediment to regulatory reform. He also recommends that
10. Karmel, supra note 1.
11. Markham, supra note 2.
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the current system of commodities futures and options floor traders be
replaced with a market maker system analogous to that which exists in the
over-the-counter securities markets.
WARREN ON INSIDER TRADING IN EUROPE
Over the past decade there have been a number of highly publicized
insider trading cases in the United States. Insider trading has also been the
center of a number of recent scandals in the Japanese markets. It thus is
not surprising that in connection with the economic unification of western
Europe, the European Community was concerned with regulating insider
trading. In his article,1 2 Professor Warren analyzes the various approaches
to insider trading regulation that could have been adopted by the EC and
the mandatory model act that was eventually adopted. The model act is a
minimum standards act that requires each of the twelve member states to
enact national legislation. Professor Warren commends the EC effort insofar
as it provides a good basis for providing a definition of insider trading-a
process that has been most difficult in the United States. He also welcomes
the rejection of the duty-based approach 3 to insider trading that he believes
plagues the law in this country. Professor Warren is critical of the breadth
of the EC's minimum insider trading prohibitions. He believes that by
deciding to take a middle ground, modelled on the approaches currently
taken in France and the United Kingdom, the EC has failed to provide
adequate protection against insider trading. In particular, he is critical of
the EC's failure to require its members to extend insider trading prohibitions
only to primary insiders who have "direct access" to inside information by
virtue of their "employment, profession or duties" with regard to the
company in question but not to what he refers to as secondary insiders
who are those who otherwise come into possession of inside information.
In this regard, EC law is in accord with the current state of United States
jurisprudence and has rejected a possession test that was at one time urged
by the SEC.
14
12. Warren, supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. In 1987 Congress began to consider legislation that not only would have defined
illegal insider trading to encompass the misappropriation theory but also would have contained
a remedy for investors in the open market taking the other side of the illegal trades. In
adopting the 1988 insider trading legislation, Congress considered adopting a definition of
what constitutes improper trading on inside information. There was some move to expand the
misappropriation theory by outlawing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information. It was alternatively proposed that a possession test was too broad and the
prohibition should be limited to the improper use of the information. Nevertheless, as was the
case in 1984, the attempt to legislatively define insider trading was dropped and the statute
was enacted without any such definition. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1988).
